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A Nation’s Role in Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting:  







Every jurisdiction has the sovereignty to design tax laws and to raise revenue in accordance 
with the needs of its citizens.  However, domestic tax regimes designed in isolation, and 
which fail to take into account an increasingly globalised world, have the potential to create 
distortionary effects and allow for tax minimisation opportunities.  This results in domestic 
base erosion caused by international profit shifting.  While tax regimes operate at a 
domestic level, multinational entities (MNEs) operate to maximise profits globally.  As 
such, MNEs operating as global enterprises take advantage of the differences between the 
tax rules of individual countries which focus on domestic policy.  Popular press and 
governments alike suggest that it is profitable MNEs such as Starbucks, Amazon and 
Google to name a few, which are acting in an unscrupulous and immoral manner to exploit 
differences in tax regimes resulting in little or no income tax liability.  The implication 
drawn from this information, disseminated via media sources, is that compliance issues are 
at the fore of domestic base erosion.  However, the issue is more fundamental and less 
intriguing than international tax evasion by MNEs.  Studies have demonstrated that MNEs 
are increasingly engaging in aggressive tax planning.1  It is often simply achieved via the 
disparity between domestic tax laws and current global business models, even when those 
domestic laws adopted are based on internationally accepted tax principals and/or contained 
in double tax agreements.  As such, the issue that needs to be addressed is the responsibility 
that governments themselves should bear for this base erosion and profit shifting, along 
with collaborative and cooperative actions required to ensure that the international tax 
regime is one which reflects current economic reality. 
 
The uneasy tensions that exist between domestic tax laws based on sovereign rights as 
contrasted with international tax coordination and cooperation is not a new phenomenon.  
Over the decades, this tension has resulted in difficulties for governments wanting to be 
seen to conform to generally accepted international tax norms while at the same time 
protecting its own revenue base and maintaining a competitive advantage over other 
jurisdictions.  The recent global financial crisis however, has provided impetus for many 
jurisdictions and international bodies to reconsider the tax laws driving MNE behaviour.  
Recently, the OECD published it report entitled Addressing Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting.2  This was a widely anticipated initial report on the problems arising from the 
activities of MNEs in an international tax setting and was released only days before, and in 
connection with, the February 2013 G20 finance ministers meeting.  In that report, the 
                                                            
 Professor, QUT Business School, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia.  
Email: Kerrie.sadiq@gmail.com 
1 See for example: Avi-Yonah, R. and Y. Lahav (2011), The Effective Tax Rate of the Largest US and EU 
Multinationals, University of Michigan Law School, Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 41; 
Clausing, K.A. (2011), The Revenue Effects of Multinational Firm Income Shifting, Tax Notes, 28 March 
2011, pp. 1580-1586;  Gravelle, J.G. (2010), Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, United 
States Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, 3 September 2010.  
2  OECD (2013), Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing.  
http://dx.doi.org.10.1787/9789264192744-en   
2 
 
OECD recognised the tension between sovereignty and international co-operation stating 
that ‘tax policy is not only the expression of national sovereignty but it is at the core of this 
sovereignty, and each country is free to devise its tax system in the way it considers most 
appropriate’3.  However, constraining this sovereignty are competing global imperatives 
such as international competitiveness balanced against harmful tax practices and the 
overarching impasse of the ‘race to the bottom’.   
 
The current tensions do not suggest that there is not a great deal of collaboration and 
coordination within the current international tax regime.  Both domestic regimes and tax 
treaties generally contain ‘jurisdiction to tax’ rules which are grounded in principles 
addressing the issue of double taxation.  While rules vary across jurisdictions and treaties, 
there is broad consistency in relation to business income in that adopted laws generally 
require the presence of a permanent establishment in a jurisdiction before that jurisdiction 
has the right to tax.  The determination of the right to tax does not however assist with the 
measurement of profits to be attributed to a jurisdiction.  Rather, it is the transfer pricing 
rules which determine the measure of profits to be allocated.  The internationally accepted 
principle for determining the transfer price is the arm’s length principle.  This is a concept 
that was introduced in the 1920s by the League of Nations, with the OECD, since 1979,4 
articulating ways in which tax authorities can determine an arm’s length price.5  The arm’s 
length principle is currently embodied in most domestic legislation, the model tax 
conventions of both the UN and OECD, and practically all existing tax treaties.  Arguably, 
therefore, there is substantial international collaboration and coordination within the 
international tax arena in the context of transfer pricing.  However, it is also the traditional 
transfer pricing regime, which has become the internationally accepted norm, that is at the 
root of much of the base erosion and profit shifting that the OECD is currently attempting 
to address.  
 
Often advocated as a theoretically superior alternative model to the current transfer pricing 
regime with its arm’s length requirement, is unitary taxation with formulary apportionment 
to allocate profits to jurisdictions.6  This is a model which would require a significant shift 
away from the current approach to taxing MNEs, effectively requiring the abandonment of 
the arm’s length principle.  Ideally, unitary taxation would be adopted through a globally 
coordinated program with agreement on important issues such as the definition of the 
unitary business as well as the definition of the formula.  In essence, this means that if a 
move was to occur on a global scale away from the traditional arm’s length principle, there 
would need to be international collaboration and cooperation in relation to a new 
overarching policy to be adopted, along with agreement and adoption of its various 
components.  As such, a unitary taxation model is a regime which would require 
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considerable ceding of sovereignty and a different form of collaboration and cooperation to 
what has previously been seen.  A move towards a new, globally accepted regime would 
also need to overcome two significant obstacles.  First, it would need to overcome the fact 
that the current international tax regime is bound by path dependencies based on the 
avoidance of double taxation rather than the prevention of less than single taxation.  
Second, it would need to overcome the fact that the current transfer pricing regime is bound 
by path dependencies tying it to the arm’s length principle.  The development of these 
dependencies is evident in both domestic regimes and the work of international bodies such 
as the OECD and UN and in the context of transfer pricing in particular, with the guiding 
principles of the OECD being adopted by many jurisdictions. 
 
Examples of domestic jurisdictions ceding a limited amount of sovereignty within the 
transfer pricing arena are already evident, but only in the context of ceding that power to 
traditional principles in the form of the OECD guidelines for determining the arms length 
price.  Both the UK and Australia are such examples and have introduced legislative 
provisions within domestic legislation which tie their transfer pricing regime to OECD 
guidelines.  The UK provisions are well established, originally contained in Schedule 28AA 
of the Income and Corporation Tax Act (UK) 1988 and rewritten in Part 4 of the Taxation 
(International and Other Provisions) Act (UK) 2010 (TIOPA) - specifically ss 147 and 164.  
Section 147 provides the general conditions necessary for Part 4 of the TIOPA to apply 
(broadly where a transaction take place between two persons who meet the “participation 
condition” and that transaction differs from one at arm’s length) and states that the basic 
transfer pricing rule is that the profits and losses should be computed as if the transaction 
had been at arm’s length.  However, complementing s 147 is s 164 which provides that Part 
4 of the TIOPA is to be read in a way that is consistent with the way in which Article 9 of 
the OECD Model Tax Convention is read when included in a tax treaty entered into by the 
UK.  This requirement is regardless as to whether there is a tax treaty between the UK and 
any particular non-UK territory.  The effect of this section is to import into the transfer 
pricing legislation not only the principles of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention 
but also that organisation’s transfer pricing guidelines.  
 
While the practice of explicitly adopting the OECDs transfer pricing guidelines within the 
UK domestic legislation is well accepted, not all jurisdictions have traditionally 
implemented this approach.  To that extent, Australia has only recently amended its transfer 
pricing regime, now contained in Divisions 815B-E of the Income Tax Assessment Act 
1997, to explicitly state that the arm’s length principle is to be interpreted so as to best 
achieve consistency with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrations.  While the Explanatory Memorandum to these 
amendments state that the purpose was to modernise the transfer pricing regime contained 
in Australia’s domestic law, it also makes it clear that the underlying purpose is the ensure 
that Australia’s transfer pricing regime aligns with what is considered the internationally 
consistent approaches set out by the OECD. 
 
As suggested by the recent OECD report, it is essential and timely that base erosion and 
profit shifting be addressed, but there is no doubt that tax sovereignty is one of the 
challenges that will be faced in any proposed solution.  However, this paper argues that 
base erosion and profit shifting is of itself a threat to tax sovereignty, and as such, 
jurisdictions will need to adopt a more collaborative approach.  It is also important that 
proposed reforms to the international tax regime not be bound by the path dependencies to 
4 
 
principles grounded in a different pre-globalisation era when MNEs undertook very 
traditional transactions.  As such, this paper considers the implications for jurisdictions on 
their sovereignty if, as part of the solution package, it is recommended that nations adopt 
unitary taxation with formulary apportionment to allocate the taxing rights to profits.  This 
is done in the context of the degree of international coordination and cooperation that 
would be required to implement such a significant change in policy.  This paper concludes 
that while there are significant hurdles to overcome at the agreement and implementation 
stage, unitary taxation is a theoretically superior model in a 21st century environment where 
MNEs operate as modern global enterprises.  As such, nations will need to take 
responsibility for the solution to base erosion and profit shifting by considering new and 
innovative policy options and accepting that a greater degree of sovereignty will need to be 
ceded. 
 
